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Abstract Large and persistent gaps in subnational public expenditure have impor-
tant implications regarding growth, equity, and migration. In this context, we revisit
the question of expenditure convergence across the American states to provide more
nuanced evidence than found by a small number of previous studies. We employ a
methodology due to Smeekes (Bootstrap sequential tests to determine the station-
ary units in a panel, 2011) that sequentially tests for unit roots in pairwise (real per
capita) expenditure gaps based on user specified fractions. In a panel of 48 combined
state–local government units (1957–2008), we found that expenditures on highways,
sanitation, utility, and education were far more convergent than expenditures on health
and hospitals, police and fire protection, and public welfare. There was little evidence of
“club convergence” based on the proportion of intraregional convergent pairs. Several
historically high-grant receiving states showed relatively strong evidence of conver-
gence. Our results bode well for future output convergence and opportunities for
Tiebout-type migration across jurisdictions. They also imply a diminished role for
public infrastructure and education spending in business location choices over time
and a mixed role for federal grants in inducing convergence.
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1 Introduction
In the past few decades, the US system of fiscal federalism has witnessed a process
of devolving some federal responsibilities to the state and local governments (SLGs)
coupled with growing federal grants to SLGs to support their expanded role. A major
outcome of this process, characterized as “devolution evolution” with the federal
government as the “dominant senior partner,” has been a dramatic growth in SLG
expenditures.1 Baicker et al. (2012) document this growth in SLG total expenditure
and its components (relative to GDP) over the period 1952–2006.2 After analyzing the
effects of federal grants, fiscal competition, mobility, voting patterns, and demographic
and income trends that might have explained the observed data patterns, the authors
draw an intriguing conclusion: “…much of the growth in state budgets has been driven
by intergovernmental interactions. Restricted federal grants to states have increased,
and federal policy and legal constraints have also mandated or heavily incentivized
state own-source spending, particularly in the areas of education, health and public
welfare” (p. 1079).
Studies of trend in the level of SLG expenditures may shed light on perhaps a
more interesting question concerning the evolution of the spatial distribution of these
expenditures. After all, federal grants and other factors that might have been driving the
growth in SLG expenditures can also explain changes in their spatial distribution to the
extent that they exert differential growth effects across SLG units. However, whether
or not such distribution has evolved in a way that (real per capita) expenditures across
states are actually converging cannot be ascertained from studies of expenditure size.
The question of expenditure convergence is an important one for several interre-
lated reasons. Firstly, large public expenditure gaps across SLGs that persist over
time are inconsistent with the objective of narrowing cross-state fiscal disparity that is
considered as a “widely embraced goal” in the context of a federalist form of govern-
ment (Yilmaz et al. 2006). While fiscal equalization programs have not been formally
adopted in the USA, many federal policies and grant restrictions are intended to effec-
tively exert a leveling effect on SLG expenditures.3 Therefore, it is worth exploring
whether, after several decades of federal fiscal activism, there is also evidence of expen-
diture convergence consistent with federal policies. Secondly, there is a large body
of literature, motivated by Barro’s (1990) paper, suggesting that the composition of
public expenditures has important growth implications. “Productive” public expendi-
tures (infrastructure, R&D, and human capital, for example) are argued to be “growth
enhancing” as they generate positive externalities to private firms, complement private
1 See Nathan (1996), Tannenwald (1998) uses these terms in relation to the schizophrenic nature of
the devolution process in the context of his analysis of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. However, as
demonstrated by the Affordable Care Act of 2010, these terms aptly describe an important feature of the
US fiscal federalism since then.
2 The authors report that “Local direct spending increased from 5.8 to 10.6 % of GDP during this period,
with most of this growth occurring before the 1970s. In contrast, state direct spending increased steadily
over this period, rising almost threefold from 3.1 % of GDP in 1952 to 8.6 % in 2006” (p. 1080).
3 The “general revenue sharing program” instituted by the federal government during 1972–1986, for
example, disbursed unrestricted funds to subnational (local) governments and had mild equalizing features.
Like some grants today, it took personal income into account.
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investments and/or improve their productivity. “Nonproductive” public expenditures
(also referred to as “social welfare/protection”), on the other hand, tend to mainly
redistribute income. While these expenditures are generally viewed as “growth retard-
ing”, they are important from an equity perspective. Accordingly, it matters which
category of public spending is spatially converging, if at all. Thirdly, large and persis-
tent public expenditure gaps may be detrimental to broad-based economic prosperity,
social harmony, and national cohesion. If left unaddressed, they may ultimately require
more radical policy interventions than would have otherwise been necessary. Finally,
as argued by Scully (1991), spatial convergence of fiscal regimes diminishes the oppor-
tunity for “Tiebout-type migration” (Tiebout 1956) according to which citizen–voters
migrate to jurisdictions with public benefit–tax packages that best match their prefer-
ences. Thus, to the extent that net in-migration to the generally low tax–low spending
states of the South (originating especially from the high tax–high spending states of
the Northeast and California) in the past several decades was fiscally motivated, one
would expect a slowdown in this pattern of interstate migration as spending spatially
convergences over time.
In addition to federal (grant) policies, the confluence of a number of other forces
may drive expenditure convergence. These include economic integration, interjuris-
dictional fiscal competition, factor mobility, globalization (trade) related pressures,
and “yardstick competition” induced by geographic proximity. On the other hand,
differences in voter preferences and heterogeneity in political and fiscal institutions
across jurisdictions tend to moderate the influence of these leveling forces. If powerful
and persistent, they may slow down the speed of convergence in some jurisdictions
enough to cause divergence in the long run. Such divergence may be reinforced by
Tiebout migration to the extent that fiscally induced migration is significant. Assessing
the net effect of these forces is further complicated by the fact that they interact. For
example, federal grants may influence fiscally motivated migration decisions and ideo-
logical orientations and political considerations may affect the growth rates of different
SLG expenditure categories that are supported by federal grants and/or own-source
revenues.
The empirical literature on fiscal convergence at the US subnational level, unlike
that on subnational output level, is quite small. In one of the earliest studies of this kind,
Scully (1991) hypothesizes that if income per capita levels and income distributions
converge spatially, then tax regimes will converge spatially too. He finds supporting “β-
convergence” evidence (a negative relationship between the rate of growth of a variable
and its past level) for this hypothesis over the period 1960–1980. The convergence in
expenditures is not directly tested by the author but is implied: “...increased equality
of income increases the rate of taxation and hence the size of the public sector” (p.
57). Fisher and Navin (1992) find that the interstate narrowing of per capita spending
was less and the variation in the effective tax rates (own-source revenue-income ratio)
was more than what would have been expected based on changes in state population,
income, grants, and other factors. They conclude that intestate fiscal variations reflect
“real desires” and, in view of significant difference in underlying preferences and
perspective, “interstate competition will not and should not eliminate interstate fiscal
differences” (p. 477).
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Kenworthy (1999) assesses whether “σ-convergence” (a declining coefficient of
variation over time) materialized among the fifty American states in the context of
several decades of US economic integration. His fiscal variables include state tax-
output ratio and real benefit level of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).
He presents CV values for 1970, 1980, 1990, and 1996 and concludes that there were
not significant declines in the CVs for either of the two variables. More generally,
however, he concludes that there is little support for the leveling effect of economic
integration. This is mainly attributed to “…the space for variation permitted by market
competition and to the importance of economic institutions in mediating the impact
of market forces” (p. 867).
Annala (2003) tests for (conditional)β-convergence andσ-convergence of per capita
real output and several tax and expenditure categories among SLGs over the period
1977–1996. With few exceptions, his findings generally support convergence in the
fiscal variables. The exception on the spending side is the health and hospitals cat-
egory. In a similar study, Skidmore and Deller (2008) report results consistent with
β-convergence in relation to several municipal expenditure categories in Wisconsin
over the period 1990–2000. Coughlin et al. (2007) contribute to theβ-convergence liter-
ature by employing a more sophisticated approach. They incorporate three alternative
“spatial weight” matrixes that account for the effects of “spatial interdependence” on
fiscal policy and output paths across states. In a panel of 48 contiguous states during
1977–2002, they find rather consistent evidence of β-convergence for real per capita
total, education, highway, and public welfare, but not for health and hospitals expendi-
tures. This finding is corroborated by the evidence from σ-convergence between 1977
and 2002.
Annala and Chen (2011), however, examine fiscal convergence using a stochastic
approach. They employ two tests to detect presence of a unit root in real per capita levels
of general, education, health and hospitals, and highway expenditures in a panel of 48
contiguous states over the period 1977–2000. Their results reject the null hypothesis
of a unit root, implying convergence, for all the variables with the exception of the
health and hospitals and public welfare categories. Finally, as a corollary to their study
of state government size, Baicker et al. (2012) calculate CVs for spending categories
at 5-year intervals between 1957 and 2002. The CVs do not show systematic changes
in dispersion for the categories other than for health and hospitals (mostly rising) and
public welfare (mostly falling).
A major drawback common to the methodologies employed in previous studies is
the “all-or-none” nature of the evidence they produce.4 That is, acceptance or rejection
of the convergence hypothesis is an inference made for all the panel members.5 Thus,
the possibility that only a fraction of the panel may be converging is ruled out. This can
lead to conclusions based on unwarranted generalizations. In this paper, we seek to
empirically examine two major questions motivated by the above discussions: One, is
4 Other limitations include the fact that that β-convergence is uninformative about a distribution’s dynamics
as it captures only a “representative” economy’s dynamics (Quah 1996). Moreover, β-convergence is a
necessary, though not sufficient condition for σ-convergence. See Islam (2008) for a formal proof.
5 Strictly speaking, the IPS (Im et al. 2003) test used by Annala and Chen (2011) tests the null of individual
unit root against the alternative that a nonzero fraction of the panel is stationary. However, the authors make
inferences about the whole panel.
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there evidence of expenditure convergence at the SLG level? Two, if so, in which SLG
unit(s) and in relation to what expenditure category the evidence is more pronounced?
To this end, we examine the data on per capita real total expenditure and several of
its economic and functional (sub)categories for a panel of 48 combined state–local
government units over a period spanning five decades (1957–2008). We substantially
depart from previous studies by employing a novel stochastic methodology referred to
as the “bootstrap sequential quantile test” (BSQT) of unit roots in all possible pairwise
expenditure gaps. This methodology, proposed by Smeekes (2011), has several advan-
tages over conventional panel unit root tests applied to levels. Firstly, is it particularly
well-suited for the task at hand as it allows for sequential testing of the null hypothesis
of nonstationary (or divergent) pairwise gaps based on user specified fractions. As
such, rejection (or non-rejection) of the null does not apply to the entire panel, but to
the specified fraction at each stage. In panels with relatively small N, the fraction can
be selected in a way that allows one to identify individual convergent gaps within the
panel. Secondly, it avoids the problem of controlling for the size of the test as in mul-
tiple testing. Thirdly, the use of all possible pairwise gaps implies that our results are
not sensitive to the choice of a benchmark for defining gaps (Pesaran 2007). Finally,
a narrowing of the pairwise gaps does not imply that all SLG expenditure levels are
converging to the same steady-state level as in “unconditional” β-convergence tests;
but rather a reduction in the overall spatial expenditure dispersion.6
The rest of this paper proceeds as follow. Section 2 briefly discusses some of the
forces that potentially drive spending convergence (divergence) and some interac-
tions among them. Section 3 outlines the empirical methodology of the paper based
on BSQT. Section 4 presents three sets of results corresponding to three levels of
aggregation: the full panel, regional groups, and individual SLG unit. The last section
summarizes the findings and discusses their implications.
2 State–local government expenditure convergence
This section draws from several strands of research to identify some of the factors that
may affect the spatial distribution of public expenditures by narrowing (or widening)
expenditure gaps over time.
2.1 Economic “laws” and relationships
At a fundamental level of analysis, as noted by Skidmore and Deller (2008), gov-
ernment expenditures are subject to the law of diminishing returns. On the supply
side, the marginal product of public (capital) spending diminishes at higher levels of
spending. On the demand side, the marginal utility of government provided goods
and services also diminishes at higher levels of consumption. This implies that, all
else being equal, high-spending SLGs should have less incentive to further spend on
some categories and their citizens should have less willingness to pay for them as
6 We thus avoid confusing “catch up” with “homogenization” which happens when some low-
spending/poor SLGs narrow their spending gaps with high-spending/rich states, while, at the same time,
the gaps within the low-spending states themselves are widening (Kenworthy 1999).
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additional expenditures and payments would yield “less bang from the buck.”7 The
opposite holds true in low-spending SLGs. Accordingly, the higher (lower) the level
of present spending, the lower (higher) will be its rate of future growth. This growth
rate differential is expected to drive convergence over time.
Spatial convergence in SLG spending, however, may simply reflect spatial conver-
gence of output. The latter is a fundamental proposition of the “neoclassical growth
model” (Solow 1956).8 If one is willing to further assume that expenditures are a
constant proportion of (lagged) output, then output convergence should result in con-
vergence of expenditures; albeit at a different speed.9 This assumption, however, is
challenged by Wagner’s Law (1893), which states that the (relative) size of the pub-
lic sector increases with per capita income reflecting increases in “social activities,”
‘administrative and protective actions,” and “welfare functions” of the state (Mus-
grave 1969). Peacock and Scott (2000) and Peacock (2006) claim that their reading
of Wagner’s original works suggests that “state activities” encompass more specific
areas such as public utilities and enterprises, public provision of health and educa-
tional services, and a social system of security. The implication is that the change in
the expenditure-output ratio may be category specific.10 Importantly, to the extent that
the ratio systematically varies with per capita income, expenditure convergence may
not result from output convergence.
Another theoretical possibility is divergence in output which, as proposed by “New
Growth Theory” (see, for example, Romer 1986), can result if spillovers associated
with abundant capital and/or skilled labor in some economic units put them on limitless
growth paths. In this case, spending convergence will not result even if spending is a
stable proportion of the output.
2.2 Federal intergovernmental transfers (“grants”)
During the past half-a-century, there has been an explosion of federal grants to SLGs
accompanying the devolution process.11 Several interrelated aspects of the grants
7 We wish to stress that more public spending is not necessarily associated with quantitatively and quali-
tatively superior set of outcomes. Therefore, the frequently employed spending measures may be a rough
proxy for spending outcomes such as output actually produced and/or benefits actually received.
8 The model postulates that under the assumptions of diminishing marginal productivity of capital, capital
mobility and technological diffusions, output (per worker) across jurisdictions converges to the same steady-
state level (“unconditional /absolute convergence”).
9 Annala (2003) and Skidmore et al. (2004) incorporate this assumption into the neoclassical growth
model to test for β-convergence in public spending and/or taxes. Annala’s (2003) conditional β-convergence
results indicate that real per capita state general expenditures and tax revenues converged at a rate more
than twice that of state output. Spatial models estimated by Coughlin et al. (2007), however, suggest that
total expenditures converged faster and tax revenues converged slower than output.
10 In this connection, Mahdavi (2011) reports that during the period 1957–2006 the ratio of SLG highway
expenditures to GDP actually fell while the corresponding ratios for police and fire protection, education,
and utility remained roughly constant. On the other hand, insurance trust benefits, public welfare, financial
administration and general control, and interest on general debt categories (significantly) gained in terms
of their GDP shares.
11 According to the Census Bureau data, the ratio of federal grants to SLGs total (own-source) revenue
went up from 8.4 (9) % in 1957 to over 18 (22) % in 2008 and has been rising since then.
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are worth noting in relation to the link between grants and expenditure convergence.
Firstly, as part of its redistributive function, the federal government allocates grants
to state governments, and to local governments through state-to-local grants, to ease
the burden of low fiscal capacity and reduce the extent of fiscal disparity across juris-
dictions.12 In reality, the federal grants to state governments explicitly and formally
designated for “fiscal equalization” are rather insignificant although many grants from
state governments to local jurisdictions, (such as education grants to school districts)
have a significant explicit equalizing component (Oates 1999). However, federal grants
to states, which mainly focus on a wide variety of specific functions or programs, are
allocated based on formulas that may have an equalizing feature.13
Secondly, federal grants affect the policy priorities of SLGs by altering their incen-
tive structure and encouraging them to implement programs that are consistent with
national priorities and/or meet certain national standards (CBO 2013). Aside from
(unfunded) federal mandates and regulatory requirements, the literature suggests sev-
eral channels through which grants may achieve these objectives. Grants with matching
requirements, for example, are intended to ensure cost sharing by SLGs. However, by
lowering the perceived marginal cost or “tax price” of providing goods and services
to SLGs, these grants also stimulate more spending by SLGs out of their own-source
revenues. Expenditure convergence may result as a byproduct of this “price effect.” In
this connection, Baicker et al. (2012, p. 1089) point out that “Matching grants clearly
promote higher spending, and the progressivity of the federal match may reduce het-
erogeneity if it increases spending disproportionately in low-spending states.” Federal
grants also increase the resources available to SLGs and, all else being equal, their
spending. A side effect of this “income effect” is a reduction in the extent and scope of
intergovernmental competition which acts as a constraint on expansion of SLG bud-
gets (McKenzie and Staff 1978). The impact of grants on SLG expenditures, however,
may be indirect. Holcombe and Stroup (1996), for example, find that federal grants
have a systematic positive (and asymmetric) effect on the income elasticity of SLG
expenditures.
Thirdly, on theoretical grounds, all federal grants are not expected to affect SLGs
expenditures in the same way. Gramlisch and Galper (1973), for example, argue that
open-ended matching grants (like Medicaid grants) lower the relative prices of the
aided areas and, if the demand for the aided areas is price elastic, increase the recipi-
ent government expenditures by more than the grants. Close-ended lump-sum grants,
on the other hand, are unrestricted and do not change the relative prices. If both public
and private goods have positive income elasticities, such transfers can stimulate the
recipient government expenditures and lower taxes by some. Close-ended categorical
grants (which apply to most federal programs) are transfers to be used for specific pro-
12 Yilmaz et al. (2006, p. 11) note two normative considerations as the primary source of concern about
fiscal disparity: “First, access to some minimum level of state and local public services is desirable. Second,
as long as fiscal disparity exists, residents of states with higher capacity bear a lower tax burden to obtain
this minimum than residents in states with lower fiscal capacity.”
13 The bulk of federal grants have been allocated to health, income security, education, transportation, and
housing and community services (CBO 2013). The fastest-growing category is health reflecting primarily
the growth of Medicaid. The federal match rates for Medicaid grants are inversely related to state per capita
personal income.
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grams and their stimulative effect lie somewhere between the other two types of grants.
However, they can be more stimulative than the open-ended matching grants, if they
come with the additional restriction of being limited to incremental expenditures that
exceed a base amount or “maintenance level.” Accordingly, the expenditure response
of SLGs to federal grants is affected by the composition of grants received.14 It also
depends on whether substitutions among federally supported programs are possible
and coverage overlap exists (Chernick 2000).
Given the variety of grant types and the programs they support within each expen-
diture category the overall effect of grants on the category’s convergence is rather
ambiguous. From the perspective of spending convergence (divergence), federal
grants, regardless of whether they supplement or supplant SLGs own expenditures
(or provide an opportunity to lower taxes), matter so long as they exert differential
expenditure growth effects across SLGs.
2.3 Mobility and interjurisdictional (fiscal) competition
Interjurisdictional competition has been defined as is “the manner in which the free
movement of goods, services, people and capital constrains the actions of independent
governments in a federal system” (ACIR 1991, p. 10). A number of models have
been developed emphasizing different modes of this competition (see Kenyon 1997).
The Tiebout (1956) model, for example, emphasizes the role of individuals who,
through migration, sort themselves across jurisdictions that offer the public service-
tax bundles that best match their preferences. In this context, relatively high tax rates
in a jurisdiction may drive away taxpayers while generous welfare benefits may attract
“welfare migrants” from other jurisdictions. Oates and Schwab’s (1988) model stresses
competition among jurisdictions to attract (and retain) mobile capital by offering low
taxes and providing, presumably superior, “public inputs” like educated workforce
and infrastructure to firms. Accordingly, to the extent that skilled labor and capital
are mobile the threat of their migration acts as a disciplining device in relation to the
fiscal behavior of local governments. The “exit mechanism” central to these models
is replaced by the “voice mechanism” in the ‘yardstick competition” model of Besley
and Case (1995). Here, voters in a state judge the fiscal decisions of their elected
officials using those made by officials in other (nearby) states as a yardstick.
A major insight of the above models is that the fiscal actions of jurisdictions are
interdependent. What are the implications of such interdependence for expenditure
14 It should be noted that the theoretical models that are based on budget (as opposed to utility) maximization
hypothesis suggest that the stimulative effect of grants do not depend on the exact grant type. In particular,
they reject the prediction of the conventional models that the stimulative effect of lump-sum grants (which
do not have a price effect) is the same as the effect of an equivalent change in private income. In fact, many
empirical studies find the marginal propensity to spend out of lump-sum grant funds is much larger than
that out of private income. This nonequivalence is dubbed as the “flypaper effect” to underline the point
that grant fund “sticks where it hits.” An implication of this effect is that nonmatching grants tend to remain
in the subnational government sector instead of being transferred to the private sector in the form of tax
cuts. See, for example, Fisher (1982), Hines and Thaler (1995), Holcombe and Stroup (1996), Brooks and
Phillips (2010), and Dahlby and Ferede (2014) for reviews of theory and evidence, alternative explanations
of the flypaper effect, and original references.
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convergence? According to Tiebout sorting, people vote with their feet to reveal their
preference for a different fiscal bundle than what they received before. This desire for
fiscal heterogeneity or differentiation is expected to reinforce existing differences in
fiscal regimes that run against convergence.15 On the other hand, some states may feel
compelled to become more fiscally similar to other states due to yardstick competition,
or as they try to “keep up with the Joneses.”16 Shannon (1989) suggests that both
interstate competition and comparison set upper and lower bounds on state fiscal
decisions and behavior and, thus, act as a stabilizing factor.
The following points are worth noting. Firstly, the extent of yardstick competition
may be category specific (see footnote 20). Secondly, grants may interfere with the
process of output (and expenditure) convergence through factor mobility and inter-
jurisdictional competition. This happens if grants slow down factor mobility, attenuate
its equilibrating effect on factor prices, and diminish its disciplinary effects through the
“exit mechanism.” Also, grants may change spending composition in favor of “non-
productive” expenditures and thus undermine the process of income convergence.17
Thirdly, one would expect that fiscal interdependence (competition and comparison)
to be more intense among states that belong to a “club” whose members are similar
with respect to some characteristics. Convergence among club member states may
result, because each state is arguably more sensitive to the policies of other states that
are more similar to it than less so. One such characteristic is geographic proximity of
states belonging to the same region.18 However, fiscal interdependence may character-
ize interaction among states that may not be geographically contiguous or proximate
(Case et al. 1993). Studies of interstate fiscal spillovers, therefore, employ different
spatial measures of “neighborliness,” to construct “weights matrices” that account for
fiscal dependence.19 Finally, fiscal interdependence may have a global dimension to
the extent that competition for mobile international capital affects state decisions in
relation to the size and composition of expenditures.
15 The Tiebout model is based on fairly strong assumptions including perfect information and cost free
migration. It may be less relevant to states than localities (Boadway and Tremblay 2012; Baicker et al.
2012).
16 For empirical evidence on yardstick competition see Case et al. (1993) and Baicker (2005), for example.
17 See Cyrenne and Pandey (2015) for the effects of fiscal equalization on the composition of government
expenditures and growth in the context of Canadian provinces.
18 Such states may be relatively homogeneous in relation to their historical background, economic structure,
as well as social, political and cultural characteristics. This reflects “the first law of geography” which states
that “Everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant things” (Tobler
1970).
19 Case et al. (1993) find evidence of state expenditure interdependence to be stronger when “neighborli-
ness” is defined based on similarity in racial composition. Coughlin et al. (2007) report results suggesting
that income and/or demographic similarities were more important in relation spatial correlations of expen-
diture growth rates with two exceptions: education (for which contiguity mattered more) and health and
hospitals (for which no evidence was found). Baicker (2005, p. 541) notes that “We might expect different
types of spending to be more sensitive to neighbors’ spending than others. There may be more yardstick
competition in administrative spending or public safety, or there may be greater fear of recipient immigra-
tion in social services spending...States may look to geographic neighbors to judge transportation expenses,
while looking to states where residents move to or from when concerned with being a welfare magnet.”
She finds that the degree of interstate population mobility performs relatively better in capturing spillover
effects among states in relation to Medicaid spending.
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2.4 Political and fiscal institutions
Government total spending and its composition and growth rate are affected by a
wide array of actors that interact within political and fiscal institutions. These actors
include citizen–voters, interest groups, lobbying organizations, elected officials, and
bureaucrats who act based on self-interest. Political parties, presumably reflecting
citizen–voters’ ideology and expectations regarding the role of government and scope
of its responsibilities, determine the partisan balance of the legislative and the exec-
utive branches of the government. The latter, in turn, affects the allocation of funds
among competing needs through setting budget priorities and imposing fiscal con-
straints in the form of gubernatorial veto power, balanced budget requirements, tax
and expenditure limits (TELs), and/or debt limits. Actors both inside the government
(bureaucrats) and outside of it (interest groups and lobbyists) influence the develop-
ment of budget to varying degrees. Moreover, citizen–voters may directly express their
preferences for certain publicly funded projects and programs through initiatives and
referenda.
These actors and institutions play a vital role in the process of political medi-
ation between forces that exert a leveling effect on government expenditures and
actual outcomes of the budget process. Political entrepreneurs may find it beneficial
to fund and expand some programs, through federal grants or own revenues, if the
programs enjoy strong support from the public or various lobbies and/or are perceived
as “developmental.” On the other hand, they may limit or cut funds to programs that
are politically contentious, not backed by active and powerful constituencies, and/or
perceived as “redistributive” in nature.20 However, public preferences, the partisan
balance of power in government, institutional configurations, and what is viewed as
both fiscally feasible and politically acceptable vary across states and localities. Spa-
tial variations in these factors may, in turn, lead to policy variations, distinct response
patterns, and path dependency in fiscal matters.21 These variations counter the forces
that drive expenditure convergence and, if persistent and rigid enough, they may even
cause divergence.
Finally, states differ with respect to the proportion of total state–local government
expenditure that is controlled by local governments. Since there are numerous local
20 The following findings from a study of state welfare spending commissioned by the Department of
Health and Human Services (The Lewin Group 2004; p. ES.4) illustrate the role of some of the factors
noted above in funding various programmatic spending categories: “Choices affecting cash assistance
spending seemed to be more influenced by the ideological views of elected officials. By contrast, Medicaid
policies and expenditures were, especially in the rural southern states, strongly affected by the active political
involvement of service providers, federal match rates, and federal mandates. Together, these factors have
helped to sustain Medicaid spending in poor states despite recent fiscal pressures to cut expenditures.
Finally, non-health social services were typically of low political salience and administrators were often
given significant discretion over how to allocate funds across different services. State resources, increasing
program flexibility (partly attributable to the TANF block grant), and executive priorities seemed more
important in determining how much spent on these non-health services and which services were funded
and which were not.” (Emphases added). See also related studies by Volden (1999) and Bailey and Rom
(2004).
21 For example, the “price effect” of matching grants may depend on state-specific factors and character-
istics.
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governments making spending decisions based on local needs, preferences and rev-
enue capacity that vary significantly across localities, expenditure categories that are
characterized by a large local government share are expected to be less convergent
than those with a large state government share. The discussions above suggest that
forces that may drive expenditure convergence (or divergence) (a) are varied ranging
from policy variables to globalization, (b) have effects on public expenditures that are
modified as they go through political and institutional filters, (c) affect different expen-
diture categories differently, and (d) tend to interact with one another. We next turn to
our empirical methodology to assess the net effects of these factors on expenditures
conversion.
3 Empirical methodology
3.1 Sequential unit root tests
We define convergence in terms of narrowing pairwise expenditure gaps. To put our
methodology in proper context, we begin by describing the pairwise convergence
concept of Pesaran (2007). Suppose, therefore, that the log expenditure for the ith
SLG unit in year t, denoted by ei,t , (i = 1, . . . , N and t = 1, . . . , T ), is nonstationary.
Then, a pairwise convergence is said to occur if, for any pair of SLGs (i = 1, . . . , N −1
and j = i + 1, . . . , N ), the expenditure gap gi j,t = ei,t − e j,t is stationary; thereby
ruling out both deterministic and stochastic trends. Thus, not only should ei,t and e j,t be
cointegrated with cointegrating vector (1,−1), but they should also be cotrending. This
definition is very flexible as it allows the two units to have different initial endowments,
saving rates, or rates of population growth (Pesaran 2007). Moreover, gaps are not
defined as deviations from an arbitrarily selected benchmark.
A typical approach to testing for convergence is to subject gi j,t to a panel unit
root test, which would then be testing the null hypothesis of divergence against the
alternative of convergence for at least some expenditure pairs. The problem here is that
while the null hypothesis can certainly be formulated as that all the pairs are divergent,
the alternative hypothesis is too broad for any interesting economic conclusions; it
could be that all the pairs are converging, but it could also be that there is only a
small fraction of pairs that converges. It is therefore important to consider methods
that can provide more information than just a rejection or non-rejection for the whole
panel. Pesaran (2007) take one step in this direction and suggest performing individual
unit root tests on each series and then estimating the proportion of stationary gaps in
the panel. The main drawback with this approach is that the estimated proportion is
only valid under the null hypothesis of a unit root. Also, the approach does not allow
one to infer whether that estimate is statistically different from the true proportion.
Recent studies have developed methods to estimate proportion of stationary gaps more
generally. One such method is the bootstrap sequential quantile test (BSQT) approach
of Smeekes (2011). The advantages of BSQT are that it can be used to estimate the
proportion of stationary gaps and identify the SLGs for which convergence holds.
Also, BSQT is one of the most general approaches available in that it allows for very
unrestricted forms of serial and cross-sectional dependence.
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Our purpose is to estimate the proportion of convergent SLG expenditure pairs
or q. Let us, therefore, denote by q1, . . . , qK the quantiles to be considered in the
BSQT approach. The number of convergent SLGs corresponding to qk is given by
ck = qk K , where x denotes x rounded to the nearest integer. Let H0 (qk) denote
the null hypothesis that the a proportion qk of all SLG expenditure pairs is convergent
(or equivalently, that ck out of the M = N (N − 1)/2 pairs are convergent), H1 (qk+1)
denote the alternative hypothesis that at least a proportion qk+1 > qk of the pairs is
convergent, and τ(qk, qk+1) be a test statistic for testing H0 (qk) versus H1 (qk+1).
The sequential testing procedure is described as follows.
3.2 Search algorithm
1. Test H0 (q1) against H1(q2).
2. If H0 (q1) is not rejected, set qˆ = q1. If H0 (q1) is rejected, test H0 (q2) against
H1 (q3).
3. Keep testing until H0 (qk) cannot be rejected anymore, and set qˆ = qk . If all null
hypotheses up until and including H0 (qK ) are rejected, set qˆ = 1.
As Smeekes (2011) shows, the above procedure is asymptotically (as T → ∞)
valid in the sense that the probability of ending up with a too low or too high estimate
is zero. Hence, if we denote the significance level of the test by α, then we have that
lim
T →∞ P(qˆ = q) = 1 − α. (1)
As for the construction of τ(qk, qk+1), let us denote by θi j the individual unit root
test statistic when applied to gi j,t . Let us further denote by θ(1) ≤ . . . ≤ θ(M) the order
statistics associated with θi j . The test statistic to be used in the search algorithm is
given by the order statistic corresponding to the alternative hypothesis to be tested,
that is,
τ(qk, qk+1) = θ(ck+1). (2)
The particular unit root test statistic considered in this paper is a version of the union
of rejections (UR) statistic proposed by Smeekes and Taylor (2012) and can be written
as
θi j = min
{
c1ADF − OLSμi j , c2ADF − GLSμi j , c3ADF − OLSτi j , c4ADF − GLSτi j
}
GLSμi j ,
(3)
where ADF − OLSμi j and ADF − GLSμi j (ADF − OLSτi j and ADF − GLSτi j ) are the
ADF test statistics performed on gap (i, j) with the demeaning (detrending) carried out
using ordinary least squares (OLS) and generalized least squares (GLS), respectively.
The scaling factors c1, . . . , c4 are set as in Smeekes (2011) to the negative inverse of
the α-level critical values for each test statistic, which are obtained in a preliminary
bootstrap step. The UR statistic can be seen as a bootstrap version of the asymptotic
test of Harvey et al. (2012) which has the advantage of allowing one to deal with
uncertainty regarding both the initial condition and the deterministic trend.
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The critical values to be used at each step of the search are obtained using the
block bootstrap of Smeekes (2011, Algorithm 2), which has the advantage of being
able to accommodate virtually any type of serial and cross-state dependence. Suppose,
therefore, that we are at step 2 of the search algorithm, and that we would like to test
H0(qk) versus H1(qk+1). The bootstrap algorithm proceeds as follows.
3.3 Bootstrap algorithm
1. Regress gi j,t on a constant, or a constant and trend, and gi j,t−1. By subtracting the
mean from the resulting OLS residuals, we obtain the recentered residuals, uˆi j,t
say, which can be stacked into the M-dimensional vector uˆt .
2. Construct the bootstrap errors u∗1, . . . u∗T by drawing randomly from uˆt blocks of
length b.
3. Obtain the bootstrapped spending gaps as g∗i j,t = ρi j g∗i j,t−1+u∗i j,t , where g∗i j,0 = 0
and u∗i j,t is the element of u∗t that corresponds to uˆi j,t . Also, ρi j = 1 for all pairs
(i, j) except for those that were found to be stationary in previous steps, in which
case we set ρi j = ρˆi j , where ρˆi j is the estimated autoregressive slope from step 1.
4. Obtain the bootstrapped order statistics θ∗(1),≤ . . . ≤ θ∗(M) by applying θ∗i j to g∗i j,t .
Set τ ∗1 (qk, qk+1) = θ(ck+1).
5. Repeat steps 2-4 B times to obtain the bootstrap test statistics τ∗1(qk, qk+1), . . . , τ∗B
(qk, qk+1). Then select the bootstrap critical value as the α-quantile of the ordered
bootstrap statistics.
3.4 Technical issues and alternative tests
Before we can apply BSQT, there are a number of technical choices that have to be
made, including lag length, block length, and the number bootstrap replications. As
is well known from the time series literature, choices of this type are very important,
as different values can have a significant impact on the performance in small samples.
We begin with the criterion for choosing the lag length used to account for serial
correlation in the ADF test. We follow Ng and Perron (2001) and use the modified
Akaike information criterion (MAIC) (with maximum lag of 12(T/100)1/4), which
is an information criterion that has been tailored to particular unit root testing situation
considered here.22 Next, the block length is set equal to b = 1.75T1/3, as in as in
Palm et al. (2011). The testing is carried out at the 5 % significance level. Another
important choice is the quantiles to be tested, q1, . . . , qK . While wider quantiles leads
to more information in each test, it also increases the risk that q, the true fraction
of convergent gaps, will lie between the tested quantiles, in which case the method
will be unable to detect it. For example, if the quantiles to be tested are taken as
qk ∈ {0, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75}, the method will obviously not be able to detect if 35 or 40 %
of the expenditure pairs are convergent. However, since M (the number of expenditure
22 Since the lag length required in the bootstrapped data need not be the same as for the original data, the
MAIC is applied also within the bootstrap. For the GLS-based tests, we follow Perron and Qu (2007) and
pick the lags using the OLS detrended data.
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gaps) is rather large in our case, the quantiles can still be made quite fine without losing
too much power. Accordingly, we choose to set qk ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9}.
The BSQT results are compared with those obtained using the sequential panel
selection method (SPSM) of Chortareas and Kapetanios (2009), which consists of
carrying out a sequence of panel unit root tests, each time deleting the “most stationary”
pair. The main problem with this approach, apart from the fact that it is not as general
as BSQT, is that the evidence of stationarity is “smoothed out” leading to low power
when compared with tests based on order statistics.
4 Data and empirical results
4.1 Data
We collected the necessary data for the 48 contiguous SLG units over the period 1957–
2008.23 The data and definitions for nominal per capita total spending and eleven
of its (sub)categories are taken from “State Government Finances” of the Census
Bureau. We use the price index for “Government Consumption Expenditures and
Gross Investment” at the state and local level (2000 = 100) published by the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis to convert nominal values into real ones.24 The choice
of state–local expenditure (sub)categories analyzed here was mainly based on data
availability for the entire sample period. Brief definitions of the spending variables
along with some descriptive statistics are presented in the “Data Appendix Table”.
Among the expenditure categories, CAPT and CURR are “economic” categories
and the rest are “functional.”25 There are some overlaps between the two types as
functional categories include both current and capital expenditures. On average, CAPT
accounted for roughly 15 % of total spending on a real per capita basis. CAPT grew
at an average annual rate of merely 0.6 which was far smaller than the 2.6 % rate
of growth of CURR.26 Among the functional categories, EDUC and PWEL alone
accounted for over 43 percent of total real per capita spending. No other category had
23 The choice of combined state–local government units allows us to account for all within state expendi-
tures and, at the same time, avoid complications resulting from a complex set of intergovernmental fiscal
relationships between state and local governments. Note that our sample period is much longer than those of
the studies reviewed earlier. This is important from the perspective of detecting convergence as a long-term
phenomenon in the data.
24 Two issues regarding the data need to be pointed out. First, the Census Bureau does not report the
data points for the years 2001 and 2003. We employ a simple interpolation method to replace the missing
data points. Second, ideally one would like to use more refined measures of population and price index
for conversion purposes to properly account for differences in the size of eligible or target population and
costs of provision of specific category of goods or services across jurisdictions. Data restrictions, however,
prevent this. See also footnote 6.
25 Economic categories are defined based on economic characteristics or type of spending. Functional
categories, however, are defined based on the purpose of spending.
26 In FY 2008, local governments accounted for about two-thirds of all capital spending. The main areas
of capital spending at the local level were in relation to schools, general government structures, and local
utilities. At the state government level, the capital spending priorities were highways and higher education
(Marlowe 2012).
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a relative share that was greater than 10 %. The fastest (slowest) growing functional
category was PWEL (HWAY).
4.2 Preliminary data analysis
For comparison purposes only, we apply two frequently used methods in previous
studies to our data. The first method employs the coefficient of variation (CV= standard
deviation/mean) to see if the cross-sectional relative) dispersion of expenditure is
narrowing over time (σ-convergence). CV is most informative about convergence
(divergence) when it displays a fairly consistent downward (upward) trend between the
beginning and end points of the sample period. Figure1a–c present the trends in CV for
three groups of variables. Among the economic categories grouped together in Fig. 1a,
CV-TOTL (21.3, 16.3) and CV-CURR (20.4, 16.1) show mild decline between 1957
and 2008 (sample beginning and end CV values are shown in parentheses). CV-CAPT
(29.7, 33.0), on the other hand, does not exhibit any trend. Figure 1b shows the CVs of
three basic infrastructure subcategories: CV-UTIL (87.3, 73.7), CV-SANT (47.6, 28.9)
Fig. 1 Coefficient of variation of categories of state–local government real per capita expenditure (1957–
2008, percent)
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and CV-HWAY (33.5, 32.4). With the exception of an extended period of decline in CV-
UTIL between 1978 and 1999, the subcategories do not exhibit a consistent downward
trend in CV either. Finally, Fig. 1c suggests a rather steady decline in CV-INSU (62.3,
36.6), CV-PWEL (41.4, 25.9), CV-POLF (40.9, 25.5), and CV-EDUC (21.5, 14.7).
Among the remaining categories, CV-HHOS (32.2, 49.1) exhibits a clear upward trend
for much of the sample period, while CV-FAGC (46.8, 34.7) is essentially trendless.
There are reasons for exercising caution in inferring convergence (divergence) from
the dynamics of CV. To illustrate, consider the plot of the CV-CAPT series which
is basically trendless over the entire sample period. However, the CV values may be
interpreted as consistent with convergence or divergence depending on the sub-period
over which they are reported. In addition, as a measure of deviations from the sample
mean, CV does not reveal information about changes in bilateral gaps among units.
Thus, the trendless behavior of CV-CAPT does not necessarily rule out the possibility
that these gaps among (a subset of the sample) have been be narrowing over time.
More generally, as the BSQT evidence presented later suggests, the link between the
trend in CV and the fraction of convergent bilateral gaps is rather weak underscoring
the interpretive issues associated with CV.
The second method used in some previous studies is the IPS panel unit root test
(Im et al. 2003). Unlike Annala and Chen (2011) who apply the IPS test to the level of
spending variables, we use demeaned values to alleviate size distortion problem asso-
ciated with contemporaneously correlated residuals across SLGs. We find that the null
hypothesis of unit root (no convergence) can be rejected in all cases with the exception
of PWEL.27 Again, interpreting this result as evidence supporting convergence (or no
convergence) among all cross-sectional units may be misleading, for only a fraction
of the panel in each case may be (non)stationary. With these caveats in mind, we turn
to our main results based on BQST.
4.3 Main results from sequential tests
4.3.1 Full panel results
Table 1 summarizes the results of the two convergence tests in terms of the highest
percent of convergent expenditure pairs (hereafter, “convergence ratio”), or more pre-
cisely, the highest percent of all pairs for which the null of a nonstationary gap could
be rejected. Two general observations are in order: First, the convergence ratio varies
from zero (for PWEL) to a maximum of 80 % (for CAPT) with a number of values
in between these two extremes. This underscores the advantage of our more nuanced
approach relative to those that produced “all-or-none” type outcomes. Second, the
evidence in favor of convergence is much stronger based on the BSQT when com-
pared with the evidence produced by the SPMS test. Both tests, however, generate
fairly consistent results in terms of the relative magnitudes of the convergence ratio
across expenditure categories. In what follows, we focus on the results based on BQST
which, for reasons noted before, is our preferred method.
27 Results are not reported here but are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 1 Percent of convergent pairwise state–local government expenditure based on alternative tests in
full panel (N = 48, T = 52)
Test TOTL CURR CAPT SANT HWAY UTIL EDUC HHOS PWEL POLF FAGC INSU
BSQT 20.0 10.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 40.0 60.0 10.0 0.0 30.0 10.0 60.0
SPSM 12.8 0.0 39.0 45.4 40.0 21.4 32.6 0.0 0.0 22.0 2.2 27.3
Results indicate the number of convergent pairwise spending gaps as a percent of M = N (N −1)/2 = 1128
possible pairs
BSQT Bootstrap sequential quantile test (Smeekes 2011), SPSM The sequential panel selection method of
Chortareas and Kapetanios (2009)
Expenditure variables in the top row are defined as follows: TOTL total (current plus capital), CURR
current, CAPT capital, SANT sanitation, HWAY highways, UTIL utility, EDUC education, HHOS health
and hospitals, PWEL public welfare, FAGC financial administration and general control, INSU insurance
trust benefits
Among economic expenditure categories, there is virtually no evidence of a broad
spatial convergence in relation to TOTL and CURR. Based on the BSQT results, only
20 % of the 1,128 possible bilateral gaps have been narrowing in the case of TOTL and
merely 10 % in the case of CURR. On the other hand, CAPT (with a trendless CV)
shows evidence of a much broader spatial convergence at 80 %. Put together, these
results suggest that the low convergence ratio for total expenditure largely reflects lack
of convergence in the current expenditure component of it. This result is not surprising
given that current expenditures comprise the bulk of total state–local expenditures.
As for basic physical infrastructure expenditures, the convergence ratio is 70 %
for SANT and HWAY and 40 % for UTIL. These subcategories include projects that
are supported by federal grants. HWAY, which has the highest spending share among
the three, has particularly benefited from federal grants for a long time. Given the
characteristics of federal highway grants, it is not unreasonable to conclude that they
have incentivized SLG highway spending and contributed to its convergence.28
Education services (EDUC) is a category that is widely considered as a major con-
tributing factor to enhancing the stock and quality of “human capital.” Reflecting its
special status, EDUC accounted for about one-third of total real per capita spending
over the sample period. State governments have been traditionally responsible for
higher education and local governments for elementary and secondary education.29
Against the backdrop of national emphasis on education, a drive to raise educational
standards, equalizing state grants to local governments, and the importance of contigu-
ity on spatial correlation of education spending (Coughlin et al. 2007), EDUC shows a
convergence ratio of 60 %. Apparently, the forces driving spending convergence were
strong enough to largely offset expected divergence in a category that is dominated by
a very large number of local governments.
28 According to a report by the Congressional Research Service (Kirk 2013), since the early 1920s much
of the federal highway funds were apportioned to the sates by formula with a matching rate of 100 percent
until the 1950s. Currently, the matching rates are 80 percent for non-Interstate System road projects and
90 % for Interstate System projects.
29 In 2008, about 8 % of the federal grants to SLGs was allocated to education. K-12 institutions received
about 55 % of their funding from federal and state governments (Fisher 2010).
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The health and hospitals (HHOS) and public welfare (PWEL) categories comprise
what is referred to as “social services and income maintenance” spending. Their com-
bined average share of total spending on a real per capita basis was under 18.2 %, but
they received a disproportionate share of federal grants to SLGs. The convergence evi-
dence for HHOS is quite weak (10 % at best). This result is consistent with the weak
evidence of convergence for this category found by a number of previous studies.
Coughlin et al. (2007, p. 377) explain their result by noting that “Health expenditures
are likely to be based on the health needs of each state’s population. It is more difficult
for a state to change its health expenditures when its population and its health needs are
relatively constant one year to the next. States may thus find it more difficult to spend
more on health than is needed by its population.” PWEL, dominated by Medicaid,
enjoyed the fastest rate of growth (3.7 %) among all the functional categories.30 Over
50 % of all federal grants went to Medicaid alone mainly in the form of payments to
vendors and private health care providers. Given these, the finding of a zero conver-
gence ratio for PWEL (with a mostly downward trending CV) is a rather surprising
result.
A question that arises is why spending on the Medicaid has apparently failed to
converge despite of being heavily subsidized by the federal government?31 A report
prepared for the Department of Health and Human Services (The Lewin Group 2004)
offers some possible explanations. According to the report, over the period 1977–2003,
there has been a major shift in the composition of social welfare budgets in states of
all fiscal capacity towards Medicaid spending. Although federal grants constituted a
larger share of a much lower own-source spending on Medicaid in poor states, they
did not narrow absolute Medicaid spending gaps between poor and rich states. This
was because rich states spent more out of their own-source revenues and thus received
grants whose average dollar amount was actually higher than those received by poor
states.32
Another part of the answer may lie in the cross-state variations in Medicaid bene-
fit packages. States enjoy significant discretion and flexibility in administering their
own (expanded) programs by establishing eligibility standards and determining the
amount, duration, scope, and provider payments in relation to Medicaid services they
fund within federal guidelines (including “core requirements”) and in the form of
“optional benefits.” (See, for example, Snyder et al. 2012; Center on Budget and Pub-
lic Policy 2013). One may argue that diversity in Medicaid’s program design, reflecting
heterogeneity in preferences and fiscal and political institutions, (more) than offset the
30 PWEL has a health related component (Medicaid), a non-health social services component (such as
childcare and child welfare), and a “cash assistance” component (such as Aid to Families with Dependent
Children, or AFDC, and its replacement Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, or TANF).
31 States receive an (open-end) categorical grant with a matching rate for their Medicaid expenditures.
The rate, referred to as the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP), varies across states depending
on criteria such as per capita income. The regular FMAP has a range of 50–82 % (with an average rate of
57 %). States also receive matching funds for “optional benefits” they choose to provide. See Medicade.gov
for the full FMAP table.
32 Baicker et al. (2012, p. 1089) note that an increase in the federal minimum eligibility floor allows richer
states already above the floor to further increase their spending as the floor increase relaxes constraints
associated with interstate fiscal competition.
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equalizing effects of grants and prevented convergence in PWEL. Lastly, SLGs vary in
terms of demographic factors, such as the age composition of population and the per-
cent of women of childbearing age and African American, which significantly affect
the demand for health care services provided by Medicaid (Cuckler et al. 2011).
“Public safety” spending (POLF) is a spending category with a period average share
of 4.1 % and a significant local component. Its size is almost entirely determined by
local government decisions based on local community needs and resources. Given the
large number of local jurisdictions in the USA (over 80,000), the demand of public
safety service is highly varied both across states and localities within a state. Accord-
ingly, the relatively low (30 %) convergence ratio for this category is not surprising.
FAGC or governmental administration (with period average share of 3.8 %) is essen-
tially a non-convergent category also due to varied standards and needs of localities.
Another surprising result is the 60 % convergent ratio for the “insurance trust and
benefits” (INSU) component of (the non-convergent) current expenditures. INSU had
the second highest growth rate (3.1 %). The bulk of INSU spending went to “employee
retirement.” Thus, the driving force for convergence should be sought mainly in this
component of INSU. A number of studies have suggested that SLG employee pension
plans are significantly underfunded in the sense that the present value of future benefits
promised (liabilities) exceeds the plans’ assets set aside to fund them.33 In this context,
pension fund managers use contributions of current employees to pay benefits to
current retirees (Rauh 2010). Accordingly, lack of a hard budget constraint might
have contributed to growth of benefits especially where they were initially low. Other
possible explanations are the effects on retirement benefits of public employee unions,
rising life expectancy, and the growth of SLG employment to the extent that these
effects were larger in poor- low-spending states.34
4.3.2 Club convergence results
We next examine whether convergence is a “club” phenomenon using geographic
proximity to capture similarities among member states. To this end, we calculate
the convergence ratio within several regional subsamples. Regions provide a broad
context for geographic spillovers, for they include a group of states not all of which are
geographically contiguous but share other characteristics. Our regional classifications
are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).35
33 See, for example, Public Fund Survey (2013) available at http://www.publicfundsurvey.org. Accumu-
lation of future liabilities is masked by governments’ use of a “cash-flow” based accounting method in
which revenues (expenditures) are recorded when they are received (paid) instead of an “accrual” based
accounting method which records revenues (expenditures) when the rights to receive (obligations to pay)
arise (Block 2008).
34 Our simple calculations, based on the Census Bureau state employment data (available at http://www.
governing.com), indicate that Mississippi and Massachusetts, for example, experienced an average annual
state employment of 6.4 and 2.5 % between 1960 and 2008, respectively. Over the same period, the real per
capita INSU spending grew at an average annual rate of 4.0 and 2.2 % in Mississippi and Massachusetts,
respectively.
35 The BEA’s guiding principle for grouping states into regions is homogeneity with respect to economic
and social factors. The following classifications are used: New England (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts,
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In our context, club convergence is measured in terms the proportion of a region’s
total convergent expenditure pairs that is intraregional (“intraregional convergence
ratio,” hereafter).36 To obtain this proportion, we first determine the number of total
convergent pairs for each of the 48 SLG units (see the next subsection). Using the
individual unit results, we next calculate for each region the number of all intraregional
convergent pairs as a percent of the region’s total number convergent pairs.
Table 2 shows the intraregional convergent ratios. To put the percent values in
perspective, the corresponding number of total convergent pairs is also reported under-
neath each percent value.37 Caution must be exercised in interpreting the results. While
a high percent in any individual case indicates a high proportion of intraregional con-
vergent pairs, the percent values are not strictly comparable across rows and columns in
view of variations in the number total of pairs. It is immediately apparent from Table 2
that there is little support for intraregional convergence as the majority of reported
values are less than 15 percent. So to the extent that convergence is actually occurring
much of it is of interregional type. One possible explanation for these results is the
diminished importance of geographic proximity over time as lower transportation and
communication costs have increased cross-regional mobility.
The closest we come to a “club convergence” outcome is in relation to the Southeast
region which has a relatively high percent of intraregional convergent gaps in a number
spending categories. Apparently, interstate spending spillovers are relatively more
significant in this region whose states are bonded together by their historical heritage
and are similar with respect to characteristics such as relatively conservative political
and fiscal institutions as well as high proportion of poor population and degree of
reliance on federal grants.
4.3.3 Individual state–local government results
Having discussed the results at high and intermediate levels of aggregation, we now
turn to individual SLG results. The objective here is to determine which SLG unit
has been most convergent and in what spending category. For each unit, we calculate
its convergence ratio as the total number its convergent expenditure pairs divided by
47 (= N − 1).38 The ratio may be loosely interpreted as the extent to which a SLG
Footnote 35 continued
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont); Mideast (Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, New York,
and Pennsylvania); Great Lakes (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin); Plains (Iowa, Kansas,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota); Southeast (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West
Virginia); Southwest (Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas); Rocky Mountain (Colorado, Idaho,
Montana, and Utah); and Far West (California, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington). Note that we excluded
both Alaska and Hawaii from the Far West region as fiscal outliers.
36 For a region with n states, there are n(n − 1)/2 intraregional gaps and n(N − n)/2 interregional gaps
where N = 48.
37 For example, the 15.8 % shown for New England under TOTL means that out of a total 38 convergent
total expenditure pairs found for the region’s member states six were intraregional.
38 Note that in determining the numerator of this ratio, the case of a convergent spending pairs between units
X and Y, unlike in Tables 1 and 2, is counted separately for each unit. Also, as in Table 1, the denominator
is a fixed number which means that a higher ratio necessarily means a higher number of convergent pairs.
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unit’s spending is “linked” to those of other units. Table 3 shows the results in percent
terms with the top (bottom) 5 % values in each column shown in bold (italic) type.39
To facilitate comparisons, results are presented based on regional classifications along
with regional ratio averages. In the last column, the average values of the convergence
ratios for each unit’s functional categories are also shown. These values provide a
broad picture of spending linkage for each unit. The results indicate wide diversity
in convergence patterns both across SLGs and spending categories. Given this, our
discussion of the results is necessarily selective.
The convergence ratio for TOTL ranges from 0 % (WY) to 53.2 percent (DE).
Accordingly, 25 (=0.532×47) states narrowed their real per capita spending gaps with
DE, but none with WY. If we decompose TOTL into its constituent components (CURR
and CAPT), it becomes clear that low (high) convergence ratio of TOTL in each state
is mainly a reflection of the low (high) convergence ration of CURR. The convergence
ratio range for CURR is 0 (NY) to 89.4 (ND) %, but ND is a clear outlier and the next
highest value is 23 % (RI). CAPT has a range of 17.0 (CA) to 97.9 (WA) %. As for the
nine functional categories, we first examine the average values for each state shown in
the last column. The highest value observed is 51.1 % for DE. The large and influential
state of CA stands out for having the lowest average value (22.7 %) in the sample.
Regional overall convergence ratio averages in the last column suggest that Mid
East is the most convergent region and Far West the least. The Plains and Rocky
Mountain regions have the highest average convergence ratios in relation CAPT or
infrastructure subcategories. The Mid East states have the highest convergence ratios
in the categories of EDUC and INSU.
Several patterns in individual state results merit further discussion. Firstly, MS,
LA, AR, AL, and NM are low-income and high-grant receiving states that rank high
in terms of their “expenditure need” and low according to their “expenditure effort”
index values.40 In view of this, the fact that all these states show evidence of narrowing
expenditure gaps is a positive development. In particular, note that MS has the highest
functional category average value (49.4 %) and the other four states have average val-
ues in the low to mid 40 % range. Secondly, among the rich and high-spending states,
CA is unique in that is has relatively low convergence ratios across all the spending
categories including CAPT. This suggests that CA has been on a spending path that
has been largely independent of the paths of other states. It is worth noting that, com-
pared with other high-income and high-spending states (such as CT, MA, and CT), CA
ranks higher in terms of its “expenditure need,” but lower in terms of its “expenditure
effort” index values. Lack of convergence for CA, therefore, is not due to the state’s
actual expenditure being much higher than what it “needs” to spend. Thirdly, the case
of the Dakotas (ND and SD) is instructive as it illustrates why broad generalizations
in convergence analyses should be avoided. The two states distinguish themselves
as neighbors with many common factors and high convergent ratios. Both states are
39 For example, the 31.9 % reported for AL under TOTL implies that AL’s total spending had convergent
pairs with 15 other states from the same region as AL, or other regions.
40 Yilmaz et al. (2006, p. vi) define expenditure need as “the amount that a state would have to spend on
its residents to provide services on par with the national average.” A high (low) expenditure effort indicates
that the state is actually spending more (less) than its expenditure need.
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ramping up their spending as a result of an economic boom associated with energy
(ND) and banking and finance (SD). Yet, these two states have different patterns of
convergent gaps. ND seems to be narrowing both its CURR and CAPT spending gaps
with the majority of other states. On the other hand, SD, which is the poorer of the two
states, seems to have been emphasizing the narrowing of its CAPT spending gaps.
Finally, there is some tentative evidence that fiscal institutions in the form of Tax and
Expenditure Limits (TELs) affect spending convergence.41 Using ordinal rankings of
state TELs stringency scores assigned by Resnick (2002) based on several criteria, we
find that states with the most stringent TELs (CO, MO, LA, CA, WA, AZ, and OK)
had an average current expenditure convergence ratio of 5.5 %. The corresponding
ratios for states with moderate (CT, DE, FL, SC, TN, TX, NV, and OR) and low (MA,
RI, NC, UT, NJ, MS, IA, MT, ID, AR, and SD) stringency scores were 9.6 and 5.8 %,
respectively. States with no TELs, on the other hand, had a nearly 20 % convergence
ratio. However, this evidence is merely suggestive and inferring a causal link between
TELs and the convergence ratio requires a more formal analysis that is beyond the
scope of this paper.
5 Concluding remarks
Are state and local government expenditures converging? We employed a novel
methodology which enabled us to estimate the proportion of convergent expenditure
pairs to provide a more nuanced answer to this question. Our results suggested that
convergence was a “matter of degree.” This calls into question the findings of previous
studies which implied that convergence (or lack of it) was a panel-wide phenomenon.
Moreover, the convergence ratio significantly varied across expenditure categories.
In relation to broadly defined economic categories, the convergence ratio for capi-
tal outlays was eight times that of current expenditures (80 vs. 10 %) based on our
preferred testing method. Thus, the bulk of total state–local government expenditures
was non-convergent. Among functional categories, basic infrastructure, education,
and insurance trust benefits showed stronger evidence of convergence than health and
hospitals, police and fire protection, governmental administration, and public welfare.
We found little support for existence of regional convergence clubs based on the
notion that geographic proximity and common characteristics among states belonging
to the same region would be associated with a higher proportion of the region’s all con-
vergent pairs being of intraregional type. Our results further indicated that Delaware
was the most convergent and California the least convergent of all states based on the
average convergence ratio of the functional categories. Between these two extremes,
there were a wide variety convergence patterns. Several low-income and high-grant
receiving states were noteworthy for their relatively high convergence ratios in several
categories.
The strong convergence evidence in relation to capital outlays may reflect several
factors: (a) voters receive tangible benefits from spending on immobile infrastructure,
41 Beginning 1978, TELs were instituted in a number of states with the objective of reigning the state
budget by slowing down the rates of growth of taxes and expenditures.
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(b) the benefits associated with additional spending are higher where infrastructure
investment deficiencies exist, and (c) as argued by Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002), elected
officials under a majoritarian electoral system pay more attention to infrastructure
spending which is more easily targeted to their geographic constituencies than redis-
tributive transfers. This is particularly the case when capital projects are presented as
a critical factor for increasing a state’s ability to compete with other states for trade
and investments and, ultimately, raising its economic growth. The favorable attitude
on the side of both the electorate and elected officials softens up political resistance to
spending on capital projects even in fairly politically conservative states (Colorado,
Montana, and Utah, North Dakota, and South Dakota, for example, which rank high
in terms of their capital outlay convergence ratio). The essence of this argument may
also apply to spending on education a significant portion of which is on physical
capital. Also, education often enjoys wide popular support and special status as the
building block for economic competitiveness and prosperity. In sum, “keeping up
with the Joneses” is relatively easier to justify in relation to “productive” expendi-
tures. Other spending categories, however, are relatively less favorably looked upon
by members of the public and elected officials especially in conservative states and
localities. Social welfare is particularly politically contentious in part due to ideolog-
ical reasons. More practical considerations, such as the fear of becoming a “welfare
magnet,” while apparently not triggering off a “race to the bottom,” can impose enough
constraints on welfare spending to prevent its convergence around an upward spending
trend.
Our findings have several implications. (a) To the extent that public expenditures on
infrastructure and education are growth augmenting, their spatial convergence should
help drive future spatial convergence in output. (b) The role of state–local government
infrastructure and education spending in business location choices should diminish
as spending on these categories converge over time. (c) The low convergence ratios
associated with health and hospitals, police and fire protection, governmental adminis-
tration, and public welfare spending reflect differences in local preferences, standards,
and needs. Since localities apparently are sufficiently differentiated with respect to
these services and benefits that influence one’s choice of residence, the prospect for
Tiebout-type migration cannot be ruled out. (d) Federal grants have been singled out
by Baicker et al. (2012) as instrumental in increasing the size of state and local gov-
ernment budgets. The evidence presented in this paper, however, suggests that the role
of federal grants in inducing spatial expenditure convergence, especially in relation
to non-capital outlays, is much less clear-cut. Lack of convergence in public welfare
spending, where preference and institutional heterogeneity play a more pronounced
role, suggests that grants can increase the size of spending in some areas without induc-
ing spending convergence. On the other hand, the narrowing of non-welfare spending
gaps especially in a number of low-income states suggests that the leveling effects of
federal grants are hard to ignore.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
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Appendix
See Table 4.
Table 4 Data appendix table. Per capita real expenditure (1957–2008). Source: Authors’ calculations
Expenditure
variable
Expenditure (sub)category definition Mean Growth rate Share of
total
TOTL Total (equals current plus capital) $6127 2.2 100.0
CURR Current: current operations, assistance and
subsidies, interest on debt, and insurance
benefits and Payments
5189 2.6 84.7
CAPT Capital: all direct expenditures on contract or
force account construction of structures
buildings, grounds, and other improvements,
and purchase of equipment, land, and
structures
938 0.6 15.3
SANT Sanitation: sewerage and solid waste
management
155 2.2 2.5
HWAY Highways: construction, maintenance, and
operation of highways, streets, and related
structures
574 0.0 9.4
UTIL Utility: construction of utility facilities or
equipment, for production and distribution of
utility commodities and services
381 1.9 6.2
EDUC Education: schools, colleges, and other
educational institutions
1957 2.2 31.9
HHOS Health and hospital: outpatient health services,
other than hospital care, as well as financing
construction acquisition, maintenance or
operation of hospital facilities, provision of
hospital care, and support of public or private
hospitals (includes cash assistance and direct
payments to vendors for medical care
(Medicaid), but excludes
419 2.4 6.8
PWEL Public welfare: support of and assistance to
needy persons contingent upon their need
pensions to former employees and other
benefits not contingent on need)
700 3.7 11.4
INSU Insurance trust: cash payments to beneficiaries
(including withdrawals of retirement
contributions) of employee retirement,
unemployment compensation, workers’
compensation, and disability benefit social
insurance programs
400 3.3 3.5
POLF Police and fire protection: preservation of law
and order and traffic safety as well as
fire-fighting organization and auxiliary
services
251 2.4 4.1
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Table 4 continued
Expenditure
variable
Expenditure (sub)category definition Mean Growth rate Share of
total
FAGC Financial administration and general control: the
functions of financial administration, judicial
and legal, and general public buildings
234 2.4 3.8
More detailed expenditure e(sub)category definitions are available at Census Bureau: http://www.census.
gov/govs/definitions/
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